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feat: glob matching for redirect domains (#1084)

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* feat: glob matching for redirect domains

Signed-off-by: Xe Iaso <me@xeiaso.net>

* chore: spelling

Signed-off-by: Xe Iaso <me@xeiaso.net>

* docs: update CHANGELOG

Signed-off-by: Xe Iaso <me@xeiaso.net>

---------

Signed-off-by: Xe Iaso <me@xeiaso.net>
This commit is contained in:
Xe Iaso 2025-09-06 11:46:18 -04:00 • committed by GitHub
parent 48b49a0190
commit d35e47c655
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GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
6 changed files with 277 additions and 6 deletions
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3
lib/anubis.go
View file

@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import (
"net"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"slices"
"strings"
"time"
@ -435,7 +434,7 @@ func (s *Server) PassChallenge(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
s.respondWithError(w, r, localizer.T("redirect_not_parseable"))
return
}
if (len(urlParsed.Host) > 0 && len(s.opts.RedirectDomains) != 0 && !slices.Contains(s.opts.RedirectDomains, urlParsed.Host)) || urlParsed.Host != r.URL.Host {
if (len(urlParsed.Host) > 0 && len(s.opts.RedirectDomains) != 0 && !matchRedirectDomain(s.opts.RedirectDomains, urlParsed.Host)) || urlParsed.Host != r.URL.Host {
lg.Debug("domain not allowed", "domain", urlParsed.Host)
s.respondWithError(w, r, localizer.T("redirect_domain_not_allowed"))
return

28
lib/http.go
View file

@ -7,12 +7,12 @@ import (
"net/http"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"slices"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis"
"github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis/internal"
"github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis/internal/glob"
"github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis/lib/challenge"
"github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis/lib/localization"
"github.com/TecharoHQ/anubis/lib/policy"
@ -24,6 +24,26 @@ import (
var domainMatchRegexp = regexp.MustCompile(`^((xn--)?[a-z0-9]+(-[a-z0-9]+)*\.)+[a-z]{2,}$`)
// matchRedirectDomain returns true if host matches any of the allowed redirect
// domain patterns. Patterns may contain '*' which are matched using the
// internal glob matcher. Matching is case-insensitive on hostnames.
func matchRedirectDomain(allowed []string, host string) bool {
h := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(host))
for _, pat := range allowed {
p := strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(pat))
if strings.Contains(p, glob.GLOB) {
if glob.Glob(p, h) {
return true
}
continue
}
if p == h {
return true
}
}
return false
}
type CookieOpts struct {
Value string
Host string
@ -217,8 +237,8 @@ func (s *Server) constructRedirectURL(r *http.Request) (string, error) {
if proto == "" || host == "" || uri == "" {
return "", errors.New(localizer.T("missing_required_forwarded_headers"))
}
// Check if host is allowed in RedirectDomains
if len(s.opts.RedirectDomains) > 0 && !slices.Contains(s.opts.RedirectDomains, host) {
// Check if host is allowed in RedirectDomains (supports '*' via glob)
if len(s.opts.RedirectDomains) > 0 && !matchRedirectDomain(s.opts.RedirectDomains, host) {
lg := internal.GetRequestLogger(s.logger, r)
lg.Debug("domain not allowed", "domain", host)
return "", errors.New(localizer.T("redirect_domain_not_allowed"))
@ -290,7 +310,7 @@ func (s *Server) ServeHTTPNext(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
hostNotAllowed := len(urlParsed.Host) > 0 &&
len(s.opts.RedirectDomains) != 0 &&
!slices.Contains(s.opts.RedirectDomains, urlParsed.Host)
!matchRedirectDomain(s.opts.RedirectDomains, urlParsed.Host)
hostMismatch := r.URL.Host != "" && urlParsed.Host != r.URL.Host
if hostNotAllowed || hostMismatch {